top of page
Writer's pictureMichael Martineau

Europe Should Play a Greater Role in Upholding Freedom of Navigation in the Taiwan Strait

Updated: Feb 14


The guided-missile destroyer USS John Finn (DDG-113) undergoes replenishment-at-sea in the East China Sea before conducting its Jan. 24 Taiwan Strait Transit, via Navy Times


By: Michael Martineau


February 12, 2024


The United States increasingly relies on its allies to promote freedom of navigation in the Taiwan Strait. In 2023, an unprecedented 43% of Taiwan Strait transits included or were led by nations other than the United States. However, as China continues to increase its coercive activity in the Taiwan Strait, the net volume of Strait passages has stagnated. To ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific, U.S. allies with sufficient naval capabilities should increase their presence in the region and the Taiwan Strait to counter Chinese violations of international maritime rules and norms. 


American warships have been sailing through the Taiwan Strait for decades. Today, these transits are an extension of the Navy’s Freedom of Navigation program, which seeks to challenge excessive maritime claims not authorized by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Beijing claims the entirety of the Taiwan Strait as its territorial waters (for more information visit this NOAA explainer), which is well beyond the legal limits imposed by UNCLOS. UNCLOS, to which China is party, explicitly protects innocent passage within territorial waters. In a flagrant violation of UNCLOS, China regularly harasses commercial, civil, and military vessels that travel through its unlawful maritime claims.

e

Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs), and by extension, Taiwan Strait transits, are one component of the West’s strategy to enforce the rules-based maritime order enshrined in UNCLOS. Apart from FONOPs, U.S.-aligned naval powers engage with regional partners in dozens of named and impromptu exercises every year. Just last week, the USS Gabrielle Giffords (LCS-10) conducted a Maritime Cooperative Activity (MCA) with the Philippines Navy’s BRP Gregorio del Pilar (PS-15) as part of its tour of the western Pacific. MCAs and other exercises prepare partner navies and coast guards to respond to harassment more effectively, and better deter unsafe and illegal behavior on the high seas.



View of the USS Gabrielle Giffords from the deck of the BRP Gregorio del Pilar, via 7th Fleet on X


However, regional partners with modest fleets are scarcely able to match both the number and size of military, law enforcement, and civilian vessels employed by China to support its maritime claims. As a matter of safety, larger vessels may typically claim right-of-way over smaller vessels with ostensibly better maneuverability. In any confrontation, the claimant with the bigger vessel will have an advantage in influencing the opposing claimant’s vessel to alter its course. Larger vessels also have an edge should they choose more violent means, like employing water cannons or ramming other vessels. Taking advantage of this fact, the Chinese Coast Guard employs some of the largest cutters in the world, which it uses to pressure smaller states with competing maritime claims. Therefore, the frontline frigates and destroyers maintained by historical naval powers fill an important niche in upholding freedom of navigation and UNCLOS.



China's 12,000-ton class cutter, via Radio Free Asia


As a subset of FONOPs, Taiwan Strait transits are especially vital. Control of the Taiwan Strait has significant implications for both the global economy and regional security. Nearly half of the world's container ships passed through the strait in 2022, meaning any disruption to freedom of navigation will have a substantial impact on global trade. Additionally, the Taiwan Strait hosts several undersea cables that connect Taiwan to its outlying islands along the Chinese coast. These islands are Taiwan's front line in the event of a Chinese attack, and as Beijing has previously severed two of these undersea cables, full Chinese control of the Taiwan Strait would pose significant risks to Taiwan's forces garrisoned there. China's unlawful claim to the Taiwan Strait also disrupts the cross-strait status quo and erodes Taiwan's sovereignty. Should China succeed in denying access to the Taiwan Strait, the implications for Taiwan's strategic position are stark.


There is good news, though. Data collected by PLATracker indicates that 2023 saw record international engagement in the Taiwan Strait. For instance, Canada joined the United States in four separate transits.  In the four years prior, the Royal Canadian Navy had only made three transits.  France’s FS Prairial (F731) made an independent transit; France’s first in five years. Additionally, Australia sailed the HMAS Toowoomba (FFH-156) through the Strait, marking its first acknowledged Taiwan Strait transit in over a decade. In total, U.S.-aligned navies made as many transits in 2023 as they did in the preceding four years.



Figure 1: Allied Taiwan Strait Transits, via PLATracker


Last April, EU High Representative Jason Borrell called on European navies to improve their presence in the Indo-Pacific region. Likewise, at last May’s First Sea Lord’s Conference, French Navy Admiral Pierre Vandier announced that the Charles de Gaulle carrier strike group will deploy to the Indo-Pacific in 2024, and implored that France’s neighbors follow suit. While the United Kingdom has not made a transit since 2021, it affirms its right to do so. In 2025, the Royal Navy will deploy a carrier group to the Indo-Pacific region. The German Navy also plans to deploy a frigate and auxiliary replenishment vessel to the region this year. While these impending deployments show increased engagement by Europe’s naval powers, they leave the possibility of Taiwan Strait transits open-ended. This is insufficient. As shown in Figure 2, while international activity in the Taiwan Strait has improved, aggregate activity, including by the United States, has stagnated. As the scope of Chinese aggression continues to increase, these figures represent a failure to react in support of freedom of navigation in the Taiwan Strait. The United States, for its part, has repeatedly decried its perceived lack of hulls to support its Indo-Pacific posture. Should the United States divert naval power away from Taiwan Strait transits, the country best poised to fill the gap is China.



Figure 2: Taiwan Strait Transits since 2019, via PLATracker



The solution is three-fold. First, Europe’s pre-eminent naval powers-- France and the United Kingdom-- must make Taiwan Strait transits standard for future Indo-Pacific deployments.  Second, other European naval powers with global reach, namely the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy, should deploy front line ships to the Indo-Pacific more frequently. Germany has not deployed to the region since 2021, and the Netherlands makes a showing every other year. The Italian Navy has demonstrated its ability to deploy front line assets to the region in support of multilateral exercises, but its presence lacks persistence. If they remain unwilling to make Taiwan Strait transits themselves, regular deployments will still contribute to building regional partners’ capacities to protect their maritime sovereignty and reduce the burden on the United States. Third, Australia should build on its progress and make Taiwan Strait transits a matter of policy. Barring sweeping changes to Japanese and South Korean cross-strait policy, Australia is the sole regional ally that is willing and capable of conducting transits.  


Taiwan Strait transits, like all FONOPs, are not without risk. China has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to use its growing naval capabilities to support its maritime claims. That being said, if Europe is committed to upholding peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, its resident naval powers must be willing to demonstrate their commitment to upholding UNCLOS. The United States, for its part, should encourage these efforts to show a united front in support of a free and open Indo-Pacific. 


This article was written using PLATracker's Naval Activity in East Asia database. You can access the data here. 


About the author: Michael Martineau is a Washington, DC-based defense analyst, and tracks U.S. and allied naval activity in the Indo-Pacific as a Co-Founder of PLATracker.com.


Comentarios


bottom of page