Russian Activity Around Japan: 2024 in Review

While the focus on Russia's military activity is rightly centered on its invasion of Ukraine, the Russian armed forces maintain a significant presence in Northeast Asia. Russia's territorial dispute with Japan over the Kuril Islands remains a key point of anxiety for Moscow despite its focus on its immediate periphery in Eastern Europe. At the same time, increasing diplomatic and military coordination between Russia and China, including joint military exercises and air patrols near Japan and South Korea, has created novel security concerns across the region.

This report will use PLATracker's datasets monitoring military activity around Japan to detail the intensity, scale, and scope of Russia's military behavior and its implications for 2025.

Overview of Findings

Figure 1. Graph of SDF scramble responses to Russian aircraft by year. Note the continual decrease since 2017 broken by the uptick of activity in 2024.

Year on Year since 2017, the number of scramble responses from the Japan Self Defense Force (SDF) to Russian aircraft has decreased, dropping from 390 to 165 in 2023. In 2024, however, the number of scramble responses for Russian aircraft rose to 199, marking the end of a seven-year trend.

Figure 2. SDF scramble responses to Russian aircraft broken down by month. Note the surge from September to November.

Figure 2 shows the cadence of Russia's aerial presence over 2024. The month-to-month changes mirror previous years and largely follow weather patterns that might negatively impact pilot safety. In particular, there is a lull in August and a return to a sustained presence in September. This increase coincides with a return to favorable weather after the peak of typhoon season in August. This trend indicates that Moscow is averse to risking aircraft losses to sub-optimal weather conditions, making these flights more likely to be politically motivated than purely operational.

During the peak of Russian air activity from September to November, the SDF scrambled aircraft in response to Russian flights on 98 occasions. This is the highest number of scramble responses during this three-month period since the SDF began releasing monthly data in 2020. Although the surge coincided with favorable weather conditions, it is worth noting that the number of scramble responses increased by 196% relative to 2023, a major shift.

Figure 3. Russian aircraft publicly confirmed by the Japanese MoD. The SDF terms all TU-95 variants as simply “TU-95”. All photographed TU-95s have been the variant TU-95MS. Therefore, it is highly likely that the 12 unphotographed “TU-95s” are also of that variant.

Of the aircraft publicly confirmed by the Japanese Ministry of Defense (MoD), the TU-95MS was the most common. That said, the confirmed flights by the TU-95MS were not evenly dispersed throughout the year. In the first eight months of the year, only one formation of TU-95MS bombers was reported. Following the start of the surge in Russian activity in September, three more TU-95MS formations were publicly confirmed before the end of the year. The elevated presence of bomber formations fits into a broader trend of increased use of combat aircraft.

Figure 4. Categories of publicly confirmed Russian aircraft around Japan since 2019, organised by category. Note the increased role of combat aircraft and lessening presence of ISR aircraft.

Figure 4 details the types of Russian aircraft publicly confirmed by the MoD since 2019. Notably, special mission and support aircraft made up the lowest share of confirmed aircraft since 2019, while combat aircraft saw their highest share. This shift, coupled with the increase in Russian aerial presence writ large, indicates an increased focus on the employment of combat aircraft in flights around Japan and the possibility of a reduced presence of special mission aircraft in Russia's Far East.

Figure 5. A comparison of the share of ISR aircraft and combat aircraft in publicly released records by year. Attack aircraft were reported only twice in this six-year period and are not included in the comparison.

Most notable among the trend of reduced flights by special mission and support aircraft is the reduction in intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft. While only one ISR aircraft was publicly confirmed in 2022, their reporting rate surged to above average in 2023 before declining to below average in 2024. It is a realistic possibility that the reduced presence of ISR aircraft near Japan was the result of key developments in the Ukraine conflict. The invasion of Kursk, which appeared to take Moscow by surprise, may have increased the demand for ISR aircraft to fill gaps in coverage. At the same time, it is a realistic possibility that the increased use of combat aircraft near Japan is an attempt by Moscow to maintain credible deterrence against Japan and the US amid claims that Russia's position in the Pacific has been degraded as a result of its invasion of Ukraine.

Figure 6. Number of instances of publicly confirmed Russian vessels by year. While the MoD releases scramble statistics, giving a population base for trends concerning Russia's aerial presence, such a source does not exist for Russia's naval presence. Therefore, this data should be taken as a representative sample reflecting a broader trend, rather than a population showing the entire situation.

The scale of Russian naval activity in 2024 also represents a break from established trends. As shown in Figure 6, the number of publicly confirmed Russian vessels operating near Japan increased year on year from 2020, reaching an all-time high of 225 in 2023. In 2024, however, there was a significant drop to 141 publicly confirmed instances, the largest reduction in a single year on record.

Figure 7. Number of publicly confirmed sightings of Russian vessels by month in 2024.

As with Russia's air activity near Japan, its naval presence is somewhat tied to environmental conditions. Japanese waters have their highest waves in January and February. These conditions persist in the northern waters, especially near Kamchatka, through May, explaining the lower levels of activity in the first five months of the year. Waters are more reliably placid from June onwards, allowing for a higher level of Russian naval activity. However, August presents a notable exception, as this is the peak of typhoon season in Northeast Asia.

Figure 8. Publicly confirmed Russian vessels by year broken down into categories.

The vessels publicly confirmed by the MoD are primarily surface combatants. Of these surface combatants, the corvette is the most prominent. This is relatively unsurprising, as corvettes are often used for coastal patrols. One-third of the corvettes publicly confirmed by the MoD in 2024 were seen in formations, which included larger surface combatants, such as destroyers or cruisers. Two-thirds of publicly confirmed corvettes were the largest surface combatants in their formation.

Figure 9. Publicly confirmed ISR vessels in 2024. Note the prevalence of the Vishnya and the Balzam, both SIGINT-focused ISR vessels.

The most common type of ISR vessel sighted in 2024 was the Vishnya class, an espionage ship focused on signals intelligence (SIGINT). Since the 2020s, the Vishnya class and other SIGINT-focused ISR vessels, such as the Balzam class, have become more common around Japan. Previously, hydrographic survey vessels such as the Finik class took up a larger share of the Russian ISR vessel presence.

In a trend opposite that of Russia's aerial presence, ISR vessels have become more common around Japan since Russia invaded Ukraine. These ISR vessels spend more time around Okinawa and the East China Sea than other vessels, which are more often tracked in the Sea of Okhotsk or the northern Sea of Japan. The more southerly areas frequented by Russian ISR vessels are closer to US military installations. Therefore, it is a realistic possibility that Russia is using ISR vessels in place of ISR aircraft to monitor US military activity in Japan.

Figure 10. Average commission year of publicly confirmed vessels over time. Note how the average commission year becomes increasingly recent starting in 2017.

As recently as 2017, most Russian ships spotted by the SDF were commissioned in the 1980s. However, the average commission year in 2024 was 2001. This means the average commission year of Russian vessels near Japan has become about twenty years more recent over a period of just seven years' time. The classes of confirmed corvettes are indicative of the broader trend. Until 2021, corvettes fielded in this region were primarily Tarantul III class vessels or a relatively even split of Tarantul III and Steregushchy class vessels. After Russia invaded Ukraine, the proportion of Tarantul III class vessels drastically decreased in favor of the newer Steregushchy class. Moscow commissioned its final Tarantul III class vessel in 2001. In contrast, two Steregushchy class vessels confirmed by the MoD in 2024 were commissioned as recently as 2019 and 2021.

Broadly speaking, Russia is deploying newer vessels around Japan in increasing numbers each year. This is likely tied to an overarching strategy of maintaining credible deterrence against Tokyo and Washington.

Assessment

When assessing Russia's presence, it is vital to note Japan's status as a treaty ally of the US and host to a significant American military presence. Any signal Moscow sends to Tokyo via military pressure is likewise a signal to Washington. Based on the available data concerning Russia's military presence around Japan in 2024, it is highly likely that Moscow is using coercive military activity to counter perceptions of weakness.

The expansion of Russian military activity around Japan is a notable break from established trends, disrupting seven years of recorded behavior. Based on the scope and intensity of Moscow’s coercive military activity in 2024, it is likely that Russian military activity around Japan will increase in 2025.

Russia is sending increased numbers of combat aircraft on patrols around Japan and fielding some of its newest ships on voyages around the Japanese home islands. Taken together, it is almost certain that Moscow is attempting to maintain credible deterrence towards Tokyo and Washington through demonstrations of military capability.

The cadence of Russia’s military activity in 2024 shows an increase in aerial and naval presence concurrent with favorable weather conditions. This means that activity in 2025 will likely be concentrated in June, July, September, October, and November. It is a realistic possibility that additional surges will occur at other points throughout 2025, depending on favorable weather.

Data on publicly confirmed Russian aircraft around Japan shows a notable reduction in flights by ISR aircraft. This is likely to remain the case, including during higher levels of activity. Simultaneously, it is highly likely that ISR naval vessels will continue to operate at increased frequency in 2025.

In 2024, Russian military assets were tracked alongside Chinese military assets around Japan 26 times. It is almost certain that these joint activities will continue through 2025. As Beijing and Moscow increase their coordination, it is a realistic possibility that joint activities will become more frequent.

Increasing Russian military pressure on Tokyo creates new complications in Northeast Asia's already complex security situation. Regional stakeholders should closely monitor these dynamics and take proactive measures to ensure that Moscow does not create circumstances that could lead to unintended escalation.

This report was written using data from PLATracker's Russian Activity Around Japan and Air Activity Around Japan trackers. The full list of PLATracker datasets can be found here.