Beyond the Typhon: 1st Multi-Domain Task Force and Sea Denial in the Philippines
- Carson Keller
- Dec 19, 2025
- 10 min read
Despite mounting diplomatic pressure from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Philippine government has upheld its support for the continued deployment of a U.S. Army Typhon missile battery in northern Luzon. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has stated the system will remain unless the PRC halts its maritime intrusions into the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and ceases harassment of Filipino fisherfolk. Since the Typhon battery’s arrival during Exercise Salaknib 2024, Chinese military and paramilitary activity in the Philippine EEZ has escalated. The pursuit of Philippine ships in their own waters by their mainland Chinese counterparts has grown so zealous that a Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) corvette accidentally rammed a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) destroyer on August 11, 2025. Meanwhile, cases of espionage by Chinese nationals in the Philippines have surged, with individuals accused of gathering intelligence on dual-use bases shared by the Philippine and U.S. militaries.
These developments have renewed focus not just on the Typhon system’s capabilities, but also on the deployed battery’s parent formation—the U.S. Army’s 1st Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF). As tensions rise, attention has turned to how this relatively new unit fits into Washington’s evolving deterrence architecture in the region. Purpose-built to counter adversary anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) networks, the 1st MDTF is uniquely suited for the role of deterring the PRC’s illegal expansion. Its mission and structure align closely with the operational challenges faced by U.S. and Philippine forces, making the archipelago an ideal environment for its employment.
The Visible Component of a Cutting-Edge Unit
To better understand how the Typhon fits into this new formation and its unique role, it is worth briefly explaining the structure of the 1st MDTF and its capabilities in the Indo-Pacific. The U.S. Army’s MDTFs are maneuverable units designed to operate within adversary A2/AD networks. In the case of the PRC, this network includes the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) surface-to-air missile (SAM), offensive missile platforms (ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic), radar stations and reconnaissance satellites. MDTFs are structured to degrade and disrupt these systems by integrating long-range precision fires, electronic warfare (EW), and multi-domain sensing, while coordinating across service lines and allied forces.
The full task force is designed as a dispersed yet integrated multi-domain formation. An MDTF is typically structured to include a Long-Range Fires Battalion (LRFB), a Multi-Domain Effects Battalion (MDEB), an Air Defense Artillery (ADA) regiment, and a Task Force Support Battalion. In its most recent iteration, the 1st MDTF’s ADA regiment also demonstrated a high-powered microwave system capable of disabling drone swarms during Exercise Balikatan 2025, showcasing the unit’s role in countering low-cost UAS threats. Together, these units give the task force a flexible balance of long-range strike, non-kinetic effects and layered air defense.
That integrated capability’s public face is Charlie Battery, 5th Battalion, 3rd Field Artillery, the Typhon unit deployed to Luzon. The battery’s ground-based launcher can fire both the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) and the Standard Missile 6 (SM-6). TLAM provides a range of up to 1,000 miles, placing targets in the South China Sea—including Hainan Island—within reach from northern Luzon. The SM-6, meanwhile, offers a versatile air and missile defense capability, able to intercept cruise, ballistic, and potentially hypersonic missile threats. The missile can also be used in an anti-surface role, as shown when a Typhon launcher from the 3rd MDTF struck a naval target with an SM-6 on July 16, 2025, during exercise Talisman Sabre 25 in Australia. These abilities make the Typhon battery’s deployment a serious challenge to PLA operations in the region and have caused the PRC to criticize its presence as escalatory.
Back in the United States, the 1st MDTF’s LRFB fields additional assets that could, in theory, be rotationally deployed to the Philippines to reinforce the Typhon battery already in place. These include another Typhon battery, a battery equipped with the U.S. Army’s new Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW), and a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) battery that will eventually have the ability to use the new Precision Strike Missile (PrSM).
The LRHW and PrSM offer significant improvements over older ground-based long-range missile systems, primarily due to their extended range and precision. The LRHW, capable of traveling at Mach 5, is reportedly able to strike targets up to 1,725 miles away. If deployed on northern Luzon, a single launcher could reach Hainan or strike deep into mainland China with a limited reaction window. The missile was successfully tested for the first time in December of 2024 and further evaluated by the 3rd MDTF in August 2025 during Exercise Talisman Sabre 25 in Australia. That deployment marked the platform’s first appearance in the Pacific and its first outside the continental United States. Meanwhile, the PrSM, mounted on a HIMARS, has a range of up to 500 km with upgrade increments planned to allow for greater range and capabilities. In June of 2024 during a sinking exercise in Palau, the 3rd MDTF fired a developmental naval-strike version of the PrSM and successfully hit a moving maritime target.
More than Missiles
While the MDTF’s kinetic capabilities are significant, its non-kinetic assets are just as critical. Alongside Charlie Battery’s deployment, another less-publicized unit—the Combined Information and Effects Fusion Cell (CIEFC)—was also deployed to the Philippines. Created during Balikatan 2023 and drawn from the MDEB, the CIEFC enables seamless coordination between U.S. forces and the Philippine’s Northern Luzon Command (NOLCOM). By leveraging unclassified commercial data and open-source intelligence, the CIEFC facilitates real-time situational awareness without the delays associated with declassification protocols.
Ongoing bilateral U.S.-Philippine information-sharing improves joint procedural interoperability. For example, using systems like Seavision, the CIEFC enhances the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ (AFP) ability to track vessels operating in the Philippine EEZ, even those with deactivated automatic identification system transponders. The cell also monitors Philippine airspace and weather patterns through radar and high-altitude balloons, supporting persistent coverage of Luzon’s air and maritime littorals. The CIEFC remains deployed at Camp Aquino, continuing to support NOLCOM and allied forces.
The CIEFC is one example of a multidomain cell (MDC), tailored from the MDTF’s MDEB. The MDEB includes a signal company, military intelligence company (MICO), extended-range sensing and effects (ERSE) company, information dominance (ID) company, and space control elements. Together, they provide the MDTF with organic ISR, EW, and space-based capabilities to locate, target, and support fires across domains. Capabilities include long-endurance unmanned aerial systems (UAS), high-altitude balloons, and EW systems to disrupt adversary communications and radar.
MDCs are flexible, crafted to meet specific mission needs and can be composed of elements from the MDEB, the wider MDTF, and friendly units. As demonstrated by the CIEFC’s work with NOLCOM, the 1st MDTF already functions as a joint enabler for the AFP and U.S. forces operating in the Philippines.
The Taiwan Connection
As 1st MDTF continues to expand its presence in the Philippines, its potential role in a Taiwan contingency scenario continues to be shaped. The unit’s elements should not be viewed as disparate groups for delivering long-range fires or intelligence collecting, but as a cohesive stand-in force. It is a survivable, mobile and service-integrated formation built to persist inside the PLA’s weapons engagement zone (WEZ) within the first island chain. Its mission may involve hindering adversary mobility, degrading C4ISR networks and disrupting sensor-to-shooter cycles. Simultaneously, it may enable U.S. and allied operations by collecting, aggregating and routing information to the joint force to generate a real-time operational picture.
This concept mirrors the U.S. Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) model, which emphasizes small, distributed, and rapidly displaceable forces that complicate enemy targeting and support sea control and denial. An example is the ongoing rotational deployment of the 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment to the Philippines as Littoral Rotational Force-Luzon for the recent Exercises Balikatan 2025 and Kamandag 9. These deployments feature capabilities that include long-range fires from the Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS), integrated air defense and sensing abilities through UAS, ground-based radar and EW systems.
However, the Army’s MDTF currently surpasses the Marine model in both offensive and defensive range, as well as in integrated defense. For example, an SM-6 from a Typhon can far outrange the Marine Corps’ forthcoming Medium-Range Intercept Capability, a crucial factor when considering the range of the ballistic missile platforms fielded by the PLARF. The absence of a dedicated long-range air defense platform in such an environment may compromise a formation’s ability to operate effectively in-theater. Similarly, the MDTF’s long-range fires far exceed the NMESIS range of roughly 115 miles, which is just enough to reach the southern tip of Taiwan from the northern Batanes Islands and some PLA-occupied bases in the West Philippine Sea (WPS) from Luzon or Palawan. By contrast, a PrSM can strike the area around the city of Kaohsiung in Taiwan from the Batanes islands as well as PLA bases throughout the South China Sea. A TLAM launched from northern Luzon is capable of reaching Hainan, Guangdong and Fujian provinces. As such, the MDTF is better equipped to execute long-range precision strikes and sea-denial missions while remaining more survivable in a contested environment.
Operationally, these advantages position the MDTF as a central node in emerging U.S. and allied efforts to contest key maritime terrain like the Luzon Strait and West Philippine Sea. This includes positioning sensors to track PLAN and CCG vessels and enabling long-range fires from U.S. and allied platforms distributed across Luzon and Palawan. In peacetime, the MDTF is helping to shape conditions favorable to U.S.-Philippine interests; in crisis, it may act decisively to degrade adversary operations.
Key to this is the MDTF’s role as a targeting node—an informational hub that fuses data from multiple sources and generates real-time fire solutions. In early March, during this year’s Balikatan, the ERSE company of 1st MDEB worked with Filipino counterparts to operate long-endurance, solar-powered UAS and high-altitude balloons, enabling reconnaissance for a rapidly deployed HIMARS battery. This demonstrated how the MDTF serves as a live link between sensors and shooters in a distributed joint force.
Working with the AFP and the Road Ahead
In a future scenario, an MDTF MDC deployed with the AFP in the Batanes islands could collaborate with a Littoral Reconnaissance Team (LRT) from 3rd MLR to detect a PLAN surface action group transiting the Bashi Channel. That data could be verified, fused with space or signal intelligence, and routed to NMESIS, HIMARS, or the AFP’s BrahMos cruise missile system. While full integration with BrahMos is still aspirational, this scenario represents a logical next step in bilateral development.
This scenario builds on real-world deployments. In April 2025, the 3rd MLR positioned both NMESIS and LRTs in Batanes, while the 1st MDTF deployed a HIMARS launcher to Batan Island. As part of Exercise Kamandag 9, both the 1st MDTF and 3rd MLR again deployed to the Batanes islands to practice simulated maritime strikes in the Luzon Strait. Together, these drills demonstrate inter-service alignment to use the Batanes as a hub for sensing and long-range fires.
Through this evolving concept, the 1st MDTF supports a joint reconnaissance-strike complex, connecting distributed sensors and shooters via nodes like the CIEFC at Camp Aquino or forward deployments in Batanes and Palawan. This posture enables persistent maritime awareness, real-time targeting, and coordinated multi-service fires without requiring large, vulnerable bases.
Given the 1st MDTF’s proven capabilities and deepening cooperation with the AFP, future Balikatan exercises should include additional rotational deployments from the unit. These could involve more MDEB sections to improve ISR integration or additional Typhon, HIMARS or LRHW batteries from the LRFB. These deployments would allow enhanced experimentation with targeting and fires coordination, including opportunities to integrate with AFP systems such as BrahMos or to train under mock electronic warfare and/or degraded conditions using the ID company.
These efforts build on momentum. Following previous HIMARS live-fires conducted by the 1st MDTF in the Philippines, the AFP signaled intent to acquire similar systems. The Philippine government has also expressed interest in Typhon-like capabilities and approved Charlie Battery’s participation in the recent AFP Combined Arms Training Exercise and this year’s Balikatan exercise.
Weighing the Geopolitical Stakes
For the U.S., rotationally deploying more elements of the 1st MDTF would demonstrate its premier anti-A2/AD force in the theater where it is most likely to operate. Of the five MDTFs planned, three are assigned to the Indo-Pacific, which underscores the PRC’s role as the U.S. Department of War’s “pacing threat.” Within the first island chain, northern Luzon offers the most strategic location for interdicting a potential PLA invasion force aimed at Taiwan. At the same time, these deployments reaffirm U.S. commitment to its oldest treaty ally in the Pacific, reassuring regional partners and enhancing integrated deterrence with Manila. Reflecting this growing importance, the 1st MDTF has been formally placed under the newly established Multi-Domain Command–Pacific, enabling better coordination with INDOPACOM. The move codifies the Army’s structure for the MDTFs and ensures sustained command oversight for future deployments to the Philippines and the wider Pacific region.
Predictably, more MDTF deployments would provoke criticism from Beijing. Philippine leaders must weigh this against persistent PRC intrusions into their EEZ and a strong national desire to defend territorial sovereignty against aggression. For the U.S., bipartisan support for the Philippines remains strong, as shown in recent bipartisan congressional delegations to Manila. Furthermore, the AFP’s Chief of Staff General Brawner gave a statement earlier this year instructing troops to prepare for a Taiwan contingency, stating that “inevitably we will be involved,” showing a gradual shift in Manila’s security posture. More recently Philippine officials have even opened to the possibility of security co-operation with Taipei, with Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro explaining that “It would be hiding from the obvious to say that Taiwan’s security will not affect us.” These statements from the Philippine defense sector may reflect a recognition of the active role the archipelago would play in any scenario where the U.S. would have to defend Taiwan.
Ultimately, as U.S.-Philippine military cooperation expands in scope and ambition, the question is not what more the alliance can do, but what it must do to maintain pace with the increasing threat from a more confident PRC. The deployment of Charlie Battery and the CIEFC has shown how even partial deployments of the 1st MDTF can bring significant capability to the joint force in the Philippines. But the full potential of the unit lies in its function as a flexible, mobile stand-in force and doing so will require deploying more of the task force. Expanding the formation’s presence in the Philippines would give both Washington and Manila an asymmetric edge and force-multiplier against the PLA. Nowhere is that capability more relevant and necessary than in northern Luzon.
